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<A>ABSTRACT 
Cognition is not just ‘in the head;’ it extends well beyond the skull and the skin. Non-Cartesian 
Cognitive Science views cognition as being embodied, environmentally embedded, enacted, 
encultured, and socially distributed. The Douglas Fir Group (2016) likewise recognizes 
languages as emergent, social, integrated phenomena. Language is the quintessence of 
distributed cognition. Language cognition is shared across naturally-occurring, culturally-
constituted, communicative activities. Usage affects learning and it affects languages, too. These 
are essential components of a theory of language cognition. This article summarizes these 
developments within cognitive science before considering implications for language research 
and teaching, especially as these concern usage-based language learning and cognition in 
second language and multilingual contexts. Here, I prioritize research involving corpus-, 
computational-, and psycho-linguistics, and cognitive psychological, complex adaptive system, 
and network science investigations of learner–language interactions. But there are many other 
implications. Looking at languages through any one single lens does not do the phenomena 
justice. Taking the social turn does not entail restricting our research focus to the social. Nor 
does it obviate more traditional approaches to second language acquisition. Instead it calls for 
greater transdisciplinarity, diversity, and collaborative work. 
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The Douglas Fir Group (DFG; 2016) recognizes languages as emergent, social, integrated 
phenomena. Language cognition is shared across naturally-occurring, culturally-constituted 
communicative activities. Language is the quintessence of distributed cognition. Language and 
usage are like the shoreline and the sea. Usage affects learning, and it affects languages, too. So, 
our understanding of language learning requires the detailed investigation of usage, its content, 
its participants, and its contexts – the micro level of human social action, interaction, and 
conversation, the meso level of sociocultural and educational institutions and communities, and 
the macro level of ideological structures.   
These emphases parallel theoretical developments in usage-based linguistics and in the 
cognitive sciences more generally. Mind is not the brain alone. Cognition is not just ‘in the head’; 
it extends well beyond the skull and the skin. Non-Cartesian Cognitive Science views cognition 
as being embodied, environmentally embedded, autopoietically enacted, and socially encultured 
and distributed. These are essential components of any theory of language cognition. 
This article summarizes these developments within cognitive science before considering 
implications for language research, especially as these concern usage-based language learning 
and cognition in second language acquisition (SLA) and multilingual contexts. Here, I prioritize 
research involving corpus-, computational-, and psycho-linguistics, and cognitive psychological, 
complex adaptive system, and network science investigations of learner–language interactions. I 
consider implications for teaching. Looking at languages through any one single lens does not do 
the phenomena justice. Taking the social turn does not entail restricting our research focus to 
the social. It does not limit any educational approach to naturalistic exposure. It does not 
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obviate more traditional approaches to SLA. Instead it calls for greater transdisciplinarity, 
diversity, and collaboration. 
But first, some history of Cognitive Psychology and Cognitive Science, particularly as 
these domains relate to language, psycholinguistics, applied linguistics, and SLA, and as they 
have come to recognize embodiment, embeddedness, enactivism, the extended mind and 
distributed cognition, and emergentism. 
 
<A>COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY AND COGNITIVE SCIENCE 
Cognitive psychology is the scientific study of mind and of mental functions such as 
learning, memory, attention, perception, reasoning, motor control, skill, language, and 
conceptual development. Its founding goals are to determine how the mind represents the 
world and how it uses these representations in thinking. In the beginnings of the ‘Cognitive 
Revolution,’ the brain was viewed as a computational system, and researchers developed 
models of information processing and successively refined them using the experimental 
method.  
Early classical information processing held that perception, cognition, and action were 
separable and that they operated in a series of stages: (a) Perception consists in input from 
world to mind (with the possible contribution of cognition to processing the input in such a way 
as to render it meaningful or useful for the subject); (b) Cognition uses this perceptual input to 
form a representation of how things are in the subject’s environment and, through reasoning 
and planning that is informed by the subject’s goals and desires, arrives at a specification of 
what the subject should do; (c) Action is the output, in the form of bodily movements, that 
results from this cognitive work. Reaction-time measurement (mental chronometry) was used 
to analyze how long each stage took (assuming serial processing stages) as well as the types of 
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experimental manipulation that separately affected these stages. The dual-task paradigm was 
used to investigate whether different abilities share mental resources or not. Cognitive 
psychological models based on the results of thousands, perhaps tens of thousands of such 
experiments became increasingly refined to allow for the possibilities of parallel or cascaded 
processing. The goal was to determine separable modules of processing, their specialisms, and 
their connectivity. These were often summarized as ‘boxes and arrows’ models. The evidence 
base was supplemented with patterns of dissociation and double-dissociation of loss of ability 
from single clinical cases in Cognitive Neuropsychology (Coltheart, 2001; A. Ellis & Young, 
1988). The cognitive neuropsychology of language was particularly fruitful. Cognitive 
psychology 1950–2000 was a time of breakthroughs, excitement, and brilliance – too much to 
list here (though see Sternberg, Fiske, & Foss, 2016). We know a tremendous amount about 
human cognition as a result (e.g., Anderson, 2015; Reisburg, 2013). 
One branch of cognitive psychology, psycholinguistics, studies the psychological and 
neurobiological factors that enable humans to acquire, use, comprehend, and produce language. 
Again, the primary concern was the mechanisms by which languages are represented and 
processed in the brain. Psycholinguistics is now a highly developed field (e.g., Gaskell, 2007). It 
has had considerable influence upon research in SLA (e.g., de Groot & Kroll, 1997; N. Ellis, 1999, 
2006a; Hatch, 1983; Kroll & de Groot, 2005; Schwieter, 2015; Segalowitz & Lightbown, 1999; 
Williams & Gullberg, 2012).  
A particularly important innovation in the 1980s and 90s was connectionism: the 
recognition that many mental phenomena can be seen to emerge from the conspiracy of 
experiences and that these processes can be computationally modelled in distributed neural 
nets that simulate the actions of interconnected neurons in the brain (Rumelhart & McClelland, 
1986). Emergentist, connectionist, and statistical learning approaches have become a mainstay 
of cognitive (Elman et al., 1996) and psycholinguistic (Christiansen & Chater, 2001) thinking, as 
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they have for theories of second language learning (N. Ellis, 1998, 2002, 2003; MacWhinney, 
1997; Rebuschat & Williams, 2012).  
Nevertheless, despite all the progress, and so much fun, the major focus of mid-
twentieth century cognitive psychology was on internal mental processes – cognition ‘in the 
head.’ In caricature, ‘Good Old-fashioned Psycholinguistics’ focused upon a learner 
characterized as “an associative network, a mechanistic processor of information, relatively 
unembodied, unconscious, monologic, unsituated, asocial, uncultured, and untutored” (N. Ellis, 
2008b, p. 12).  
 
<A>NON-CARTESIAN COGNITIVE SCIENCE AND THE 4ES 
In the late twentieth century, cognitive science came to examine a number of additional 
influences upon the mind. Four in particular, grouped under the label ‘4E’ to stand 
for anticlassical (or non-Cartesian) cognitive science (The new science of mind, Rowlands, 2013), 
are: Embodiment, Embeddedness, Enactivism, and the Extended Mind (Clancey, 2009; Robbins 
& Aydede, 2009a; Ward & Stapleton, 2012).  
 
<B>Embodied Cognition 
“The body is our general medium for having a world.” (Merleau–Ponty, 1962, p. 169) 
Embodied cognition is the recognition that much of cognition is shaped by this body we 
inhabit – by aspects of the entire body including the motor system, the perceptual system, 
bodily interactions with the environment (situatedness), and by the assumptions about the 
world that become built into the structure of the organism as a result of repeated experience 
(Wilson & Foglia, 2017).  
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Rather than perception and motor systems being merely peripheral input and output 
devices, embodied cognition posits that the mind and body interact ‘on the fly’ as a single entity. 
The pioneering text in psychology was The embodied mind (Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991), 
which explained that “By using the term embodied we mean to highlight two points: First that 
cognition depends upon the kinds of experience that come from having a body with various 
sensorimotor capacities, and second, that these individual sensorimotor capacities are 
themselves embedded in a more encompassing biological, psychological and cultural context” 
(pp. 172–173). One readable volume that encouraged this approach within the philosophy of 
cognitive science was Being there: Putting brain, body, and world together again (Clark, 1998). 
Subsequent research in psycholinguistics led to the development of theories of perceptual 
symbol systems (Barsalou, 1999) and of grounded cognition (Barsalou, 2008).  
The hotbed of embodiment research was Cognitive Linguistics. Lakoff developed his 
embodied mind thesis that much of human cognition depends upon perceptual and imagery 
sensorimotor and emotional systems – more concrete and imageable concepts do so directly, 
more abstract concepts do so by metaphorical extension. The defining texts were Metaphors we 
live by (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980) and then Women, fire, and dangerous things: What categories 
reveal about the mind (Lakoff, 1987). What Lakoff did for semantics, Langacker did for syntax by 
pioneering cognitive grammar – the analysis of how language communicates embodied 
meanings in structured ways. His two-volume Foundations of cognitive grammar became a 
major foundation for cognitive linguistic understanding of the relations between 
conceptualization and grammar (Langacker, 1987, 1999). Cognitive grammar treats human 
languages as consisting solely of semantic units, phonological units, and symbolic units 
(conventional pairings of phonological and semantic units). This extension of the notion of 
symbolic units from lexis to the grammar was in direct opposition to the mainstream linguistic 
theories of the day, and it paved the way for subsequent construction grammar approaches to 
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language (e.g., Goldberg, 1995). Tomasello gathered contributions from Langacker, Givón, Croft, 
Chafe, Wierzbicka, Hopper, Taylor, Goldberg, Van Valin, and Fauconnier together in The new 
psychology of language: Cognitive and functional approaches to language structure (Tomasello, 
1998), and a new functional approach to language was established, one that considered how 
language might be processed using general cognitive mechanisms.  
Modern cognitive linguistics (Dabrowska & Divjak, 2015; Ungerer & Schmid, 1996) has 
established itself across a broad range of inquiries: 
Because cognitive linguistics sees language as embedded in the overall cognitive 
capacities of man, topics of special interest for cognitive linguistics include: the 
structural characteristics of natural language categorization (such as prototypicality, 
systematic polysemy, cognitive models, mental imagery and metaphor); the 
functional principles of linguistic organization (such as iconicity and naturalness); 
the conceptual interface between syntax and semantics (as explored by cognitive 
grammar and construction grammar); the experiential and pragmatic background of 
language-in-use; and the relationship between language and thought, including 
questions about relativism and conceptual universals. (Geeraerts, 1995, pp. 111–
112) 
There are now a number of well-developed theories of construction grammar (Trousdale & 
Hoffmann, 2013). Together, cognitive linguistics and cognitive grammar have rich implications 
for SLA and for applied linguistics (N. Ellis & Wulff, 2015a,b; Littlemore, 2009; Robinson & N. 
Ellis, 2008; Tyler, 2012).  
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<B>Embeddedness  
“Ask not what’s inside your head, but what your head’s inside of.” (Mace, 1977, p. 43) 
 
Embeddedness is the dependence of a phenomenon (an activity, a set of relationships, 
an organization, or an individual) on its environment (defined alternatively in physical, 
cognitive, social, institutional, or cultural terms).  
The importance of the ecology of mind was made clear by Bateson in his books Steps to 
an ecology of mind: Collected essays in anthropology, psychiatry, evolution, and epistemology 
(Bateson, 2000 [1972]) and Mind and nature: A necessary unity (Advances in systems theory, 
complexity, and the human sciences) (Bateson, 1979). Bateson (1979) emphasized how our 
phylogenetic and ontogenetic histories on this planet have shaped our perception: “The rules of 
the universe that we think we know are buried deep in our processes of perception” (p. 35). 
 Ecological psychology (Gibson, 1979) emphasizes how aspects of the environment 
afford various actions to an organism relative to its sensorimotor capacities. For certain 
animals, trees are climbable: they afford climbing; for certain others, the handles of mugs are 
graspable: they afford grasping, and so forth. Affordances are ecological rather than merely 
physical features of the world, being defined in terms of the ‘systems’ relationship between the 
organism and its environment. Gibson criticized cognitive, information-processing views that 
assume indirect perception whereby physical sensations as ‘inputs’ are matched inside the head 
against mental representations in order to create meaningful percepts as ‘outputs,’ and argued 
instead in favor of direct perception. Affordances are specified in the information array (the 
‘flow field’) of the individual, they present possibilities for action, and they are available for the 
agent to perceive directly and act upon. For some 21st-century humans living in the mid-
Western United States, coffee mugs afford grasping and drinking, chairs afford sitting, the media 
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afford access to the news, and the coffee shop puts these things together just fine, so they do not 
need to consider or remember what to do in the morning; rather they simply go with the 
breakfast flow. 
Ecological systems theory (Bronfenbrenner, 1979) is a theory of human development 
which emphasizes the influences of the environmental systems within which an individual 
interacts and their relationships with contexts within communities and the wider society. The 
individual is seen within its immediate microsystem of family, peers, school, and religion, its 
mesosystem of the interactions between the microsystem components (family and school, 
family and peers, etc.), the exosystem of societal influences upon the microsystem (such as local 
politics, mass media, social services, industry, local community), and the macrosystem of the 
attitudes and ideologies of the cultural setting. Each system contains roles, norms, and rules that 
may shape psychological development. Bronfenbrenner’s ecological systems theory changed the 
perspective of developmental psychology by identifying the range of environmental and societal 
influences on child development. His work was integral to the formation in 1965 of the 
American Headstart pre-kindergarten programs. The Douglas Fir Group (2016) explains the 
influence of this model upon its framework for ‘SLA in a multilingual world’ as summarized in 
the article’s Figure 1 (pp. 24–25). Duff (2019, this issue) further analyzes the many dimensions 
of language socialization and considers how transdisciplinary team-based research is needed to 
understand cases from multiple, integrated perspectives on different scales of analysis. 
Sociocultural Theory (Vygotsky, 1980) argues that human cognition is fundamentally a 
socially mediated process that is organized by cultural activities, artifacts, and concepts. 
Vygotsky’s main assertion was that human learners are embedded in different sociocultural 
contexts, and their cognitive development is advanced through social interaction with more 
skilled individuals. Through social interaction they learn to utilize existing cultural artifacts and 
to create new ones to regulate their biological and behavioral activity. Mediation happens 
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primarily through language use, organization, and structure, occurring during participation in 
cultural, linguistic, and historically-formed settings such as family life, peer group interaction, 
and institutional contexts like schooling, social leisure activities, and workplaces. Sociocultural 
Theory (SCT) argues that while the brain is a necessary condition for higher order thinking, the 
most important mental activities develop through interaction within these social and material 
environments. Most modern theories of developmental cognitive psychology show strong 
influences of SCT. SCT has also had significant impact upon SLA, largely through the work of 
Lantolf and colleagues (Lantolf, 2006; Lantolf & Pavlenko, 1995; Lantolf & Poehner, 2014; 
Lantolf & Thorne, 2006). 
 
<B>Enactivism 
“A path is the wisdom of many feet.” (Stepney, 2018, p. 30) 
The “Classical Sandwich” view (Hurley, 1998) of the serial operation and the modular 
separation of the three layers of perception  cognition  action fails to account for the 
dynamic relationships between action and perception in situated cognition. Experience of the 
world is enacted: Mental processes are made up not just of neural processes but also of the 
routine things that the organism does, hence they are constituted by the ways in which an 
organism acts on the world and, in return, the ways in which the world acts back. “Cognitive 
structures emerge from the recurrent sensorimotor patterns that enable action to be 
perceptually guided” (Varela et al., 1991, p. 173). “A cognitive being’s world is not a pre-
specified, external realm (. . .) but a relational domain enacted or brought forth by that being’s 
autonomous agency and mode of coupling with the environment” (Thompson, 2005, p. 407).  
Biologically informed theories of enactivism emphasize autopoiesis (auto “self”, and 
poiesis “creation, production”) referring to a system capable of reproducing and maintaining 
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itself. If cognition is for anything, it is for sustaining an organism’s biological viability. Ecological 
fitness involves adaptivity and skillful interaction. Environmental features depend upon the 
activity of the cognizing system; in turn, cognition depends upon activity within an 
environment. Varela et al. (1991) compared cognition to “laying down a path in walking” (p. 
237). The existence of a forest trail can be brought about by the activity of agents navigating the 
forest: “A path is the wisdom of many feet” (Stepney, 2018, p. 30). For agents, being 
appropriately attuned to the presence of that trail affects their skill in getting efficiently from 
one point to another in the forest. Actions are motivated. The environmental features to which 
an agent is cognitively open will be those that are a function of their capacities, activities, and 
interests, and their cognitive competence needs consist in no more than an appropriate level of 
attunement to those features and their relevance.  
Simon (1962) told the parable of an ant making its homeward journey on a pebbled 
beach. Its path seems complicated. The ant probes, doubles back, circumnavigates, and zigzags. 
But these actions are not deep and mysterious manifestations of intellectual power. Closer 
scrutiny reveals that the control decisions are both simple and few in number. An environment-
driven problem solver often produces behavior that is complex only because a complex 
environment drives it. Apparent complexity may come more from the problem space than from 
the agent that learns to solve it. N. Ellis (1996) considers some implications for theories of 
Universal Grammar and of SLA.  
From an enactivist perspective, cognition is dynamical sensorimotor processes (rather 
than prescripted computational syntax) of real time variables, along with a rich self-organizing 
capacity (rather than a representational machinery): The mind is not in the head, instead it has 
roots in the body as a whole and in the extended environment where the organism finds itself.  
There are some who would go so far as to claim that 4E/anti-classical cognition denies 
any need at all for mental representations in their theories (Chemero, 2009): If everything is 
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there in situated cognition, then there is no need for representation in the learner. However, 
these anti-representationalist views clearly go too far. Clark and Toribio (1994) in their article  
“Doing without representing?” conclude that there is a continuum of problem spaces: At the 
nonrepresentational end of that continuum there are cases in which the required responses can 
be powered by a direct coupling of the system to some straightforwardly physically specifiable 
parameters available by sampling the ambient environment in some computationally 
inexpensive way (e.g., a toy car with a 'bump' sensor). At the other end of that continuum there 
are ‘representation-hungry problems’ where the problem involves reasoning about absent, 
nonexistent, or counterfactual states of affairs. It is at this end of the continuum that language 
comes to the fore. 
Clearly, we can take a person out of their usual, richly-perceptual, and situated world 
and put them in a dark empty room with nothing more than a microphone in front of them, 
away from their normal environmental affordances, away from their loved ones and normal 
social circumstances, away from their supportive media and culture, and we can ask them to tell 
their story. And tell their story they can. They have clear autobiographical memories of events 
and percepts and motoric routines and scripts and schema. They have language representations 
enough to enthrall us with their tales. Perhaps the story would be richer back in their contexts, 
co-constructed with friends; nevertheless, we all have rich autobiographical memories and the 
language to describe these, even if we do not all have the making of a successful novelist. 
Experience is important because it impacts upon us, our representations, our minds, our brains, 
our selves. Some of that experience is worldly, some of it is linguistic, and much of it 
interrelates. 
Enactivism has impacted theories of education in various ways. Interaction is at the 
heart of SCT and Activity Theory. Situated Cognition (Brown, Collins, & Duguid, 1989; Robbins & 
Aydede, 2009b) holds that knowing is inseparable from doing, and that all knowledge is 
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situated in activity bound to social, cultural, and physical contexts. Situated Learning (Lave, 
1988; Lave & Wenger, 1990) conceives of learning as increasing participation in communities of 
practice – groups of people who share a concern or a passion for something they do and learn 
how to do it better as they interact regularly. Learning is a co-constitutive process in which all 
participants change and are transformed through their actions. 
SLA research has likewise been heavily influenced by ideas like these. SCT, identity 
theory (Norton, 2000), sociolinguistic approaches (Tarone, 2007), cultural approaches 
(Kramsch, 1993, 2002), conversational analysis (Kasper & Wagner, 2011; Hall, 2019, this issue), 
interactionist approaches (Gass, 2002; Long, 1980; Mackey, 2012), the sociocognitive approach 
(Atkinson, 2002), and the various approaches gathered under “alternative approaches to SLA” 
(Atkinson, 2011) all agree that cognition is socially grounded in interaction. As Wagner (2015) 
summarizes, in such theories: 
Cognition is not understood as information processing, but as organizing embodied 
interactions between social actors in meaningful ecologies and reflexively being 
shaped by those situated encounters. Although the degree to which these 
approaches buy into issues of embodiment and ecology may differ, they share, as 
Duff and Talmy argue, a common understanding of learning as happening in 
context “through praxis . . . in the everyday activities of communities of language 
users” (Duff & Talmy, 2011, p. 96). The target for many second language learners is 
not just ‘to speak another language,’ but to become part of the social and cultural 
environment in which the language is used. This entails frequent and rich 
participation in the second-language life worlds into which the learner ‘bricolages’ 
his or her way (cf. pp. 95–96). 
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<B>Extended Mind  
“Society is our extended mind and body.” (Watts, 1989, p. 54) 
The recognition that cognition is indivisible from our embodiment, from our 
environment, and from our situated actions leads naturally on to the idea that cognition is not to 
be found in the head, nor indeed in the individual, but rather that it is a distributed 
sociotechnical system. The Extended Mind thesis was championed within cognitive science by 
Hutchins. His classic How a cockpit remembers its speeds (Hutchins, 1995b) is a detailed 
cognitive ethnography of how pilots of computerized airliners understand what their state-of-
the-art automation is doing. The framework is, as he says, “explicitly cognitive, in that it is 
concerned with how information is represented and how representations are transformed and 
propagated in the performance of tasks” (p. 265). Yet the analysis of this task of the cockpit of 
commercial airlines’ remembering its aircraft speeds shows how the cognitive properties of 
such distributed systems can differ radically from the cognitive properties of the individuals 
who inhabit them. His book Cognition in the wild (Hutchins, 1995a) is the founding text of 
Distributed Cognition (DCog) and Cognitive Ecology: “Culture is (. . .) a human cognitive process 
that takes place both inside and outside the minds of people (. . .). Culture is an adaptive process 
that accumulates partial solutions to frequently encountered problems” (p. 354).  
Hutchins (1995a, chapter 9) presents an analysis of cognitive psychology from the 
1950s–1990s which argues that, for methodological and analytic convenience, it focused upon 
individual cognition (bounded in social space, in physical space, and in time), and that this 
strategy resulted in an attribution problem – when one commits to the notion that all 
intelligence is inside an inside/outside boundary, one is forced to cram everything inside that is 
required to produce the observed behaviors. The result is to attribute to the inside much more 
than there should be. Hutchins’s book softened boundaries that had been made rigid by 
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previous approaches by locating cognitive activity in context, where context is not a fixed set of 
surrounding conditions but rather a wider dynamical process of which the cognition of an 
individual is only a part. “Just as the construction of these boundaries was driven by a particular 
theoretical perspective, their dissolution or softening is driven by a different perspective - one 
that arose of necessity when cognition was confronted in the wild” (Hutchins, 1995a, p. 1). The 
book is the locus classicus for the importance of choosing the right boundaries for the unit of 
analysis, and for the importance of studying cognition in its normal habitat, in the wild. Hutchins 
(2010) presents a very readable and succinct Topics in cognitive science update of Cognitive 
Ecology as the study of “the web of mutual dependence among the elements of a cognitive 
ecosystem” (p. 705). The Douglas Fir Group (2016), and the subsequent AAAL 2018 symposium 
SLA without (disciplinary) borders, likewise encourages unbounded perspectives on SLA. 
Hutchins’s work set the stage for Clark and Chalmers (1998) to publish philosophical 
analyses of the active role of the environment in driving cognitive processes. Their “Inga and 
Otto” thought experiment casts doubt on there being any essential difference between recall 
from the head (Inga’s Internal memory) and that from a readily available auto-authored 
notebook (Otto’s Outside memory). This article was followed by the book Supersizing the mind: 
Embodiment, action, and cognitive extension (Clark, 2010). The extended mind hypothesis claims 
that the effective circuits of human thought and reason are not entirely ‘in the head,’ and invites 
us instead to consider how technologies, social networks, and institutional structures, laws, 
educational practices, and social policies are proper parts of distributed organs for thought. One 
particular topical example is the widespread adoption, in diverse fields from surgery to aviation, 
of checklists as job-aids used to reduce failure by compensating for potential limits of 
human memory and attention (Gawande, 2009). A more widespread and omnipotent example is 
the internet and ever-present smartphone access. Better to consider ourselves not as being 
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firmly bounded biological organisms, but as reconfigurable nodes in a flux of information, 
communication, and action.  
Language is the quintessence of distributed cognition. Language is ever situated, either 
in the moment and the concrete context or by various means of mental extension to reflect prior 
or imaginary moments. 
Socially-extended cognition, where our mental states are partly constituted by the states 
of other thinkers, has origins in our enculturation (Tomasello, 1999) and in our uniquely human 
skills of intentionality: joint intentions, joint attention, collaboration, imitation, prosocial 
motives, and social norms (Tomasello, 2008). In their first two years, infants develop their 
capabilities of attention detection (gaze following), attention manipulation (directive pointing), 
intention understanding (the realization that others are goal-directed), and social coordination 
with shared intentionality (engaging in joint activities with shared interest, negotiating 
meanings), and these processes are central in child language acquisition (Tomasello, 1999, 
2008). The nature of language follows from its role in social interaction. Social interactions are 
typically characterized by what philosophers of action call shared cooperative activity 
(Bratman, 1992) or joint actions (Clark, 1996). Joint actions are dependent on shared cognition, 
a human being’s recognition that she can share beliefs and intentions with other humans. Thus, 
both usage-based approaches and SLA research emphasize how language is learned from 
participatory experience of processing language during embodied interaction in social and 
cultural contexts where individually desired outcomes are goals to be achieved by 
communicating intentions, concepts, and meaning with others. Lascotte and Tarone (2019, this 
issue) provide rich illustrations of the ways in which speakers can agentively shift from one 
internalized ‘voice’ or social identity to another in creating narrative, and how this heteroglossia 
is associated with measurable differences in their language complexity, accuracy, and fluency. 
Conversation partners scaffold and co-construct meanings. Socially scaffolded ‘noticing’ 
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(Schmidt, 1990) solves Quine’s (1960) problem of ‘referential indeterminacy’ and language-
expert/language-novice interaction can likewise solve problems of the formal indeterminacy of 
language. Focus-on-form feedback can scaffold language learning (Doughty & Long, 2003; 
Doughty & Williams, 1998; Gass, 1997; Gass & Mackey, 2007; Long, 1980; Long & Robinson, 
1998). The dynamics of language learning are inextricably linked to the dynamics of 
consciousness, in neural activity and in the social world as well (Frith & Frith, 2010). 
Consciousness is co-constructed in social interaction (N. Ellis, 2005a; Frith, 2010). In these ways 
the input to associative learning is socially gated (Kuhl, 2007).  
Language itself also plays a huge role in our enculturation (Clark, 2005). Clark and 
Chalmers (1998) emphasize that “The major burden of the coupling between agents is carried 
by language (. . .).  Indeed, it is not implausible that the explosion of intellectual development in 
recent evolutionary time is due as much to this linguistically-enabled extension of cognition as 
to any independent development in our inner cognitive resources” (p. 5). This is a theme 
developed by Logan (2007) in The extended mind: The emergence of language, the human mind 
and culture. Logan argues that verbal language extends the brain into a mind capable of 
conceptualization and hence that mind = brain + language. According to Logan, before humans 
acquired verbal language, their brain was a percept processor. Then language made the mind 
capable of conceptualization and hence able to consider things beyond the here and now. 
Schumann (Lee & Schumann, 2003; Logan & Schumann, 2005) likewise emphasizes language as 
a cultural artifact or technology that operates between and among brains. Indeed he separates it 
from the biosphere, and argues that we live within a symbolosphere, which includes all of the 
phenomena mediated by symbols, and hence includes all abstract human thought and symbolic 
communication (Schumann, 2018).  
The works cited in this section were all written in the 1990s or later, largely in reaction 
to cognitivism. However, these ideas have a long history within the philosophy of mind and 
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language (Joseph, 2017). In particular, Harris (1981, 1987) ploughed a lone, long, straight 
furrow, arguing against cognitive and linguistic approaches where thinking in all its forms, 
linguistic and nonlinguistic, was seen to rely on ‘programs’ analogous to those by which a 
computer engages in ‘information processing.’ In its place he developed an Integrational 
Approach to signs and semiological systems, an integration focus on human communication that 
is inseparable from environments and from the individual self and human agency. The 
integrational approach holds that every episode of communication, however trivial, necessarily 
involves creative activity by the participants, including their own interpretation of the situation 
in which it occurs. Words are not temporal invariants, instead, every utterance is a new 
utterance, no matter how many times someone may have ‘said it before.’ Integrationist 
approaches presume that linguistic processes are embedded in the social matrix, and, in turn, in 
a larger complex based on the simple fact that persons have relations to other persons 
(Duncker, 2017). 
Non-Cartesian Cognitive Science, has come to reconsider cognition as being essentially 
embodied, environmentally embedded, autopoietically enacted, and socially encultured. The 
human mind extends well beyond the ancient bounds of skull and skin. These are essentials of a 
theory of cognition. These are essentials of a theory of language cognition. So they are essentials 
of theories of SLA and of multilingualism (Atkinson, 2010). 
This, too, was the spirit of the Douglas Fir Group, which celebrates languages as 
emergent, social, integrated phenomena. Language cognition is shared across naturally-
occurring culturally-constituted communicative activities. Language and usage are like the 
shoreline and the sea (N. Ellis, Römer, & O’Donnell, 2016). Usage affects learning and it affects 
languages too. So, our understanding of language learning requires the detailed investigation of 
usage, its content, its participants, and its contexts – the micro level of human social action, 
interaction, and conversation, the meso level of sociocultural and educational institutions and 
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communities, and the macro level of ideological structures. In these ways, language pervades 4E 
cognition. 
 
<A> EMERGENTISM AND LANGUAGE AS A COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEM 
These ideas are the antithesis of bounded approaches, which assume that the essence of 
language can be localized, for example, in genes, or brain areas, or language acquisition devices, 
in separable linguistic structural divisions (such as lexis vs. syntax vs. semantics vs. pragmatics, 
etc.), or in language learning programs, platforms, or apps, or school curricula, or other human 
policies. Instead, they fit naturally within emergentist approaches (N. Ellis, 1998; N. Ellis & 
Larsen–Freeman, 2006a; Elman et al., 1996; Hopper, 1987; MacWhinney & O’Grady, 2015), 
which view language within a complex adaptive system (Beckner et al., 2009; N. Ellis & Larsen–
Freeman, 2006b, 2009; Larsen–Freeman, 1997; Larsen–Freeman & Cameron, 2008) or dynamic 
systems theory framework (de Bot, Lowie, & Verspoor, 2007): 
Emergentists believe that simple learning mechanisms, operating in and 
across the human systems for perception, motor action and cognition as they 
are exposed to language data as part of a communicatively-rich human social 
environment by an organism eager to exploit the functionality of language, 
suffice to drive the emergence of complex language representations.” (N. Ellis, 
1998, p. 657) 
Language has a fundamentally social function. Processes of human interaction 
along with domain-general cognitive processes shape the structure and knowledge of 
language. Recent research in the cognitive sciences has demonstrated that patterns of use 
strongly affect how language is acquired, is used, and changes. These processes are not 
independent from one another but are facets of the same complex adaptive system (CAS). 
 20 
 
 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
 
Language as a CAS involves the following key features: The system consists of multiple 
agents (the speakers in the speech community) interacting with one another. The system 
is adaptive; that is, speakers’ behavior is based on their past interactions, and current and 
past interactions together feed forward into future behavior. A speaker’s behavior is the 
consequence of competing factors ranging from perceptual constraints to social 
motivations. The structures of language emerge from interrelated patterns of experience, 
social interaction, and cognitive mechanisms. The CAS approach reveals commonalities in 
many areas of language research, including first and second language acquisition, 
historical linguistics, psycholinguistics, language evolution and computational modeling. 
(Beckner et al., 2009, pp. 1–2) 
The Associative–Cognitive CREED holds that SLA is governed by the same 
principles of associative and cognitive learning that underpin the rest of human 
knowledge. The major principles of the framework are that SLA is Construction-based, 
Rational, Exemplar-driven, Emergent, and Dialectic. Language learning involves the 
acquisition of constructions that map linguistic form and function. Competence and 
performance both emerge from the dynamic system that is the frequency-tuned 
conspiracy of memorized exemplars of use of these constructions, with competence being 
the integrated sum of prior usage and performance being its dynamic contextualized 
activation. The system is rational in that it optimally reflects prior first language (L1) 
usage. The L1 tunes the ways in which learners attend to language. Learned-attention 
transfers to L2 and it is this L1 entrenchment that limits the end-state of usage-based SLA. 
But these limitations can be overcome by recruiting learner consciousness, putting them 
into a dialectic tension between the conflicting forces of their current stable states of 
interlanguage and the evidence of explicit form-focused feedback, either linguistic, 
pragmatic, or metalinguistic, that allows socially-scaffolded development. (N. Ellis, 2006b)   
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De Bot, Lowie, and Verspoor (DBL&V)) present a persuasive case for language as a 
complex dynamic system where cognitive, social, and environmental factors continuously 
interact, where creative communicative behaviors emerge from socially co-regulated 
interactions, where there is little by way of linguistic universals as a starting point in the 
mind of ab initio language learners or discernable end state, where flux and individual 
variation abound, where cause-effect relationships are nonlinear, multivariate and 
interactive, and where language is not a collection of rules and target forms to be acquired, 
but rather a by-product of communicative processes. Usage-based approaches (Ellis, 
2003; P. Robinson & Ellis, 2008) view the regularities of language as emergent 
phenomena: the rule-like regularities captured by linguists are mere descriptions, 
explananda not explanans.” (N. Ellis, 2007, p. 23) 
 
<A>LEARNING AND REPRESENTATION 
<B>Connectionist Learning 
Late twentieth-century cognitive science recognized that many mental phenomena 
(concepts, categories, schemata, prototypes, constructions, paradigms, representations . . .) can 
be seen to emerge from the conspiracy of experiences, with more frequent exemplar types 
having greater influence.  
We see the traces laid down by the processing of each input as 
contributing to the composite, superimposed memory representation. 
Each time a stimulus is processed, it gives rise to a slightly different 
memory trace - either because the item itself is different or because it 
occurs in a different context that conditions its representation - the traces 
are not kept separate. Each trace contributes to the composite, but the 
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characteristics of particular experiences tend nevertheless to be 
preserved, at least until they are overridden by canceling characteristics of 
other traces. Also, the traces of one stimulus pattern can coexist with the 
traces of other stimuli, within the same composite memory trace. 
(Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986, p. 193) 
Connectionism explored how these learning processes can be computationally modelled 
in distributed neural nets that simulate the actions of interconnected neurons in the brain 
(Elman et al., 1996; Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986). Exemplar theory explored how humans 
make category judgments by comparing new stimuli with an ‘exemplar cloud’ of instances 
already stored in memory. Statistical learning, machine learning, and deep networks are now 
widespread across computational learning theory in artificial intelligence, computer science, 
and cognitive science. Cognitive psychology recognized that these processes of human cognition 
take place automatically and unconsciously. There was much research demonstrating implicit 
learning (Reber, 1993) and implicit memory (Schacter, 1987). Following Nisbett and Wilson 
(1977), there has been widespread recognition of the overwhelming influences of implicit 
cognition.  
Frequency effects on learning are well recognized in psycholinguistics (Bod, Hay, & 
Jannedy, 2003; Bybee & Hopper, 2001), and there is much research evidencing connectionist 
(Christiansen & Chater, 2001), statistical (Saffran & Kirkham, 2018), and exemplar-based 
(Pierrehumbert, 2016) language learning. 
Likewise in SLA and applied linguistics, there is widespread recognition of the influence 
of frequency of experience upon learning and representation (N. Ellis, 2002), of connectionist 
and statistical learning mechanisms (N. Ellis, 1998, 2003a; MacWhinney, 1997; Rebuschat & 
Williams, 2012), and of the importance of implicit language cognition (N. Ellis, 1994; Rebuschat, 
2015).  
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<B>Connectionist Memory 
In connectionist models, remembering is an inferential process, constructive as much as 
reproductive. “Connectionist models trade localized, symbolic processing for distributed 
operations that extend over an entire network of components and so result in the emergence of 
global properties resilient to local malfunction. For connectionists a representation consists in 
the correspondence between such an emergent global state and properties of the world; it is not 
a function of particular symbols” (Varela et al., 1991, p. 8). Memory traces are not stored 
separately but are integrated or “superposed” in the same set of weights. Remembering is the 
temporary reactivation of a particular pattern or vector across the units of a network. This is 
successful, or not, dependent on the conspiring influences of the current input and the history of 
the network, as consolidated in the connection weights between units. If the current input is 
strongly associated with the memorized pattern of weights for a particular construction, so it is 
successfully reactivated or “redintegrated.” Redintegration refers to the restoration of the whole 
of something from a part of it. The everyday phenomenon is that a small part of a memory can 
remind a person of the entire memory. 
 
<B>Representation Quality  
The quality and richness of a representation is a function of the type and token 
frequencies of the exemplars experienced and of their richness of features and associations. 
<C>Richness of features and associations. In 1890, in the defining text of the Principles of 
psychology, James considered language representations as follows: 
Every nameable thing, act, or relation has numerous properties, qualities, or 
aspects. In our minds the properties of each thing, together with its name, form 
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an associated group. If different parts of the brain are severally concerned with 
the several properties and a farther part with the hearing, and still another 
with the uttering, of the name, there must inevitably be brought about 
(through the law of association which we shall later study) such a dynamic 
connection among all these brain-parts that the activity of any one of them will 
be likely to awaken the activity of all the rest. (p. 55)  
This is a remarkable description of the essence of connectionist learning given that it 
was written 80 years before the advent of computational connectionist models. It likewise 
envisioned patterns of brain representations of word meanings over a century before the 
possibility of their confirmation in fMRI imaging of localizable dynamic activity across voxels in 
the cortex (see Predicting human brain activity associated with the meanings of nouns [Mitchell 
et al., 2008] and Natural speech reveals the semantic maps that tile human cerebral cortex [Huth 
et al.,2016]). It has proven to be essentially correct. On the whole, the memory representations 
that result from an experience are representative of that experience: 
1. If the properties of the experience are rich, imageable, and multimodal, so too is the 
memory (embodied cognition – e.g., perceptual symbol systems [Barsalou, 2008] ; 
imageable words are better remembered than abstract words [Paivio, 1990]; words in 
the brain [Pulvermüller, Cappelle, & Shtyrov, 2013])  
2. If the properties of experience are richly contextualized, so too is the memory 
(embedded cognition – e.g., context-dependent memory [Smith & Vela, 2001]; the 
cognitive interview [Fisher & Geiselman, 1992]) 
3. If the properties of experience are goal-directed and rich in dynamical sensorimotor 
processes, so too is the memory (enactivism – e.g., enactment effects in memory [Cohen, 
1989])   
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4. If the experience is part of a cultural script, if it plays out in interaction with others, so 
these are part of the memory too (extended mind – e.g., scripts, plans, goals, and 
understanding [Schank & Abelson, 1977]; collaborative recall and collective memory 
[Sutton, 2009], scaffolding [Donato, 1994]). 
The richness can come from depth of processing (Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Lockhart, 
2002) along the 4E dimensions listed here, and it can be enhanced through emotional content 
too (McGaugh, 2003). Psychologically rich experience leads to richer representation and better 
explicit recall.  
<C>Flow. The major force of learning is usage experience – engaged, motivated, 
purposeful, authentic, rich, enacted usage. Csikszentmihalyi (2014) refers to optimal experience as 
“flow”: 
It is useful to remember occasionally that life unfolds as a chain of subjective 
experiences. Whatever else life might be, the only evidence we have of it, the only 
direct data to which we have access, is the succession of events in consciousness. 
The quality of these experiences determines whether and to what extent life was 
worth living.” (p. 209) 
Broadly, we expect that the quality of the flow likewise determines the quality of language 
representations. 
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<C>Frequency. More experience leads to stronger representation. Language is like other 
expertise in that it requires considerable practice – the rule of thumb is that accomplishing 
expertise demands 10,000 hours on task. Frequency of experience is central in usage-based 
approaches to language acquisition (N. Ellis, 2011; N. Ellis & Wulff, 2015b) as it is in skill-theoretic 
approaches (DeKeyser, 2007; Segalowitz, 2010). Cognitive linguistic and construction grammar 
approaches emphasize that language learning is the learning of many tens of thousands of 
constructions (words, morphemes, lexico-grammatical-functional patterns . . .) and of the 
probabilistic relations between them and between them and their functions, their speakers, their 
contexts, and their genres (Bod et al., 2003; Bybee & Hopper, 2001; Gries, 2012, 2013; Gries & N. 
Ellis, 2015). This information can only come from usage (Cadierno & Eskildsen, 2015; N. Ellis, 
O’Donnell, & Römer, 2013; N. Ellis & Wulff, 2015a; Robinson & N. Ellis, 2008).  
 
<B>Representation Access 
Memories may be available but not accessible (Tulving & Pearlstone, 1966). Recognition 
is easier than recall. It is a common classroom experience that learners may have ‘got it’ one 
day, only apparently to have lost it the next. These are problems of retrieval. What is needed for 
successful access is to be reminded by an appropriate retrieval cue. There is considerable 
research on context-dependent memory (Smith & Vela, 2001). The encoding specificity 
principle of memory provides a general theoretical framework for understanding how 
contextual information affects memory (Tulving & Thomson, 1973). Specifically, the principle 
states that memory is improved when information available at encoding is also available at 
retrieval, that is, when the mental context at recall matches that at encoding. The relevant 
factors include the environmental context and the mental context including perceptual factors, 
emotional factors, scripts, plans, goals and understandings. The more these can be reinstated, 
the more recall is optimized, as demonstrated in fields as diverse as the cognitive interview in 
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eyewitness testimony (Fisher & Geiselman, 1992), the role of scaffolding in education 
(Vygotsky, 1980), and in second language education (Donato, 2000; Lantolf, 2006; Lantolf & 
Poehner, 2014). Lightbown (2008) applies transfer appropriate processing as a model for 
classroom second language acquisition. 
Learning and remembering are always situated. Their contexts extend beyond the here 
and now, streaming backwards in time through our personal and cultural histories: 
But our assessment of the role of situations in driving and shaping memory need not 
be restricted to the role of contextual features which happen to be outside the skin: 
that might be a relatively superficial characteristic. In even the most abstruse and 
detached activities of autobiographical remembering, our memory processes still 
lean and operate on the internal wing of the vast extended system of cultural and 
personal habits, hints, and patterns through which the inner representational 
regime has been sculpted and disciplined (Clark, 2005, p. 264). Again, adding a 
genuinely diachronic dimension to our picture of the neuroscience and psychology 
of memory means that we don’t have to see the temporarily isolated brain as 
fundamentally or intrinsically alone, having to revert to some purely biological 
starting-state whenever the trappings of culture aren’t around. For, again, in our 
unusual case the biological brain is itself incomplete and always already permeated 
by structures and history which take it out of itself.” (Sutton, 2009, pp. 229–230) 
<A>USAGE-BASED APPROACHES AND RESEARCH PRIORITIES 
Embodiment, environmental embeddedness, enaction, social enculturation, 
situatedness, and distributed cognition pervade usage-based approaches to language 
acquisition which investigate how we learn language while engaging in communication, the 
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“interpersonal communicative and cognitive processes that everywhere and always shape 
language” (Slobin, 1997, p. 267).  
Usage-based theories hold that an individual’s creative linguistic competence emerges 
from the collaboration of the memories of all the meaningful interactions in their entire history 
of language usage (Behrens, 2009; Bybee, 2010; Dabrowska & Divjak, 2015; N. Ellis, 2015; N. 
Ellis et al., 2013; Robinson & N. Ellis, 2008; Tomasello, 2003; Trousdale & Hoffmann, 2013). 
Hopper (1998) describes grammar as the “sediment of usage”: 
We say things that have been said before. Our speech is a vast collection of hand-me-
downs that reach back in time to the beginnings of language. The aggregation of 
changes and adjustments that are made to this inheritance on each individual 
occasion of use results in a constant erosion and replacement of the sediment of 
usage that is called grammar.” (p. 146) 
The same applies across all of the systems of language. Learning a language involves the 
learning of constructions. These are the form–function mappings that are conventionalized as 
ways to express meanings in a speech community. Constructions range from morphemes – the 
smallest pairing of form and meaning in language – to words, phrases, and syntactic frames 
(Goldberg, 2006; Trousdale & Hoffmann, 2013). That is, simple morphemes such as –able 
(meaning ‘capable of, susceptible of’) are constructions in the same way as simple words like 
nut (meaning ‘a fruit consisting of a hard or tough shell around an edible kernel’), formulaic 
phrases like thanks a lot (meaning ‘Thank you’ to a very high degree, orders of magnitude, 
really), idioms like It is driving me nuts (meaning ‘It is greatly frustrating me’), and abstract 
syntactic frames like Subject–Verb–Object–Object (meaning that something is being transferred, 
as realized in sentences as diverse as Max gave the squirrel a nut, Nick gave Max a hug, or Steffi 
baked Max a cake, where nuts, hugs, and cakes are being transferred, respectively). As the latter 
examples illustrate, not all constructions carry meaning in the traditional sense; many 
 29 
 
 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
 
constructions rather serve a more functional purpose. The passive construction, for instance, 
serves the function of shifting the focus of attention in an utterance from the agent of the action 
to the patient undergoing the action (compare the passive A cake was baked for Max with its 
active counterpart Steffi baked Max a cake) (Wulff & N. Ellis, 2018).  
 Language learning involves learning the associations within and between constructions. 
Constructionist accounts of language acquisition involve the distributional analysis of the 
language stream and the parallel analysis of contingent perceptual activity, with abstract 
constructions being learned from the conspiracy of concrete exemplars of usage following 
statistical learning mechanisms (Rebuschat & Williams, 2012) relating input and learner 
cognition. Psychological analyses of this learning of constructions as form-pairs is informed by 
the literature on the associative learning of cue–outcome contingencies where the usual 
determinants include for the construction: its frequency of experience, salience of form, 
significance of meaning, prototypicality, redundancy vs. surprise value, and the contingency of 
form and function; for the learner: factors relating to learned attention, automaticity, transfer, 
overshadowing, and blocking (N. Ellis, 2008c, 2017). These various psycholinguistic factors 
conspire in the acquisition and use of any linguistic construction.  
Taking the social turn does not do away with linguistic structure. Instead it poses a set of 
questions relating to how language structure is learned from situated experience. Thus, 
cognitive linguistics, usage-based approaches, and 4E cognitive science complement our 
understanding of language cognition. One current collaboration is the “Thinking, Doing, 
Learning” conference series. The call for TDL4 states: “The conference brings together 
researchers interested in a wide variety of questions to be answered about language usage, 
language learning, and cognition – from societal issues of what it means to interact in an L2 to 
how speakers carry out and accomplish social actions in moment-to-moment sense-making 
activities, and from the environments of language use to the nature of the sediments of these 
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usage events that are left as ‘acquired linguistic constructions’ in the individual language 
learner.” (Hannele Dufva, e-mail March 3, 2018).  
Like CA and interactional approaches (Hall, 2019, this issue), usage-based approaches 
emphasize the social and the semiotic in the creation of language, but additionally they 
recognize that repeated episodes of usage result in entrenchment and the emergence of 
linguistic structure. Contra Hall (2019, this issue), I see nothing conceptually confusing in the 
notion of construction grammar, and the enterprise of cognitive linguistics is fully in the 
transdisciplinary spirit of DFG. The scientific study of language has long recognized that 
language has observable, reliable, and productive structure at various levels (phonology, 
morphology, syntax, phraseology, pragmatic, stylistic, etc.) across multiple modalities of 
expression. We must embrace the richness and sophistication of linguistic description, while at 
the same time recognizing the paucity of linguistic theories of learning. 
These are exciting times to work in usage-based approaches to language learning 
because the enterprise brings together people working from different but complementary 
empirical and theoretical approaches: cognitive linguistics, construction grammar, functional 
linguistics, cognitive psychology, learning theory, psycholinguistics, statistical learning theory, 
child language acquisition, neuroscience, corpus linguistics, computational science, natural 
language processing, emergentism and complex systems theory, conversational analysis, 
dynamic systems theory, sociolinguistics, and social learning theory. 
All of these approaches can be brought to bear in researching how our history of usage 
affects language acquisition, knowledge, and processing. For example, N. Ellis et al. (2016) 
recently summarized a 10-year research program into the latent structure verb–argument 
constructions (VACs) as associations of form and function by means of a corpus analysis of verb 
selection preferences in 100 million words of usage and analysis of the semantic network 
structure of the verbs in these VACs. Our research emphasizes the importance of item-based 
 31 
 
 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
 
patterns and their perceptual groundings in acquisition, with abstract schematic patterns 
emerging from the conspiracy of particular usage patterns and their interpretations. Our 
analyses show that these constructions are (a) Zipfian in their verb type–token constituency in 
usage, (b) selective in their verb form occupancy, and (c) coherent in their semantics, with a 
network structure involving prototypical nodes of high betweenness centrality. Psychological 
theory relating to the statistical learning of categories suggests that these are factors which 
promote learning. We show how first and second language acquisition is driven by these usage 
patterns, and we also report a range of psycholinguistic experiments showing that frequency, 
contingency, and semantic prototypicality drive language processing in both conscious free-
association tasks and in automatic ballistic processing in recognition threshold, naming, lexical 
decision and semantic psycholinguistic processing tasks. Finally, we use connectionist 
modelling to simulate acquisition from these input patterns, and agent-based modeling to 
investigate processes of language change.  
A central concern is how latent patterns of usage promote robust acquisition. If language 
is not to be isolated in any particular top-down controlling system or language acquisition 
device, if it is emergent, then how come it is robustly emergent? How come you learned 
language from your people, I learned language from my people, our people never met, yet we 
can share meanings? There is so much exciting work to be done investigating the relations 
between language experience and language acquisition, knowledge, structure, and processing.  
Understanding how usage affects an individual learner’s languages demands the 
recording of longitudinal corpora of learner language and subsequent transcription and analysis 
using a variety of corpus, conversation analysis, and computational techniques, many specially 
devised for learner language. It requires psycholinguistic investigation of the learner’s language 
processing. It demands linguistic theory. It necessitates an appreciation of the psychology of 
learning to understand how processes of implicit, explicit and statistical learning, categorization 
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and analogy, proceduralization, and schematization affect the development of individual 
learners’ linguistic systems from the conspiracy of experiences of usage that vary in frequency, 
salience, contingency, prototypicality, emotionality, embodiment, groundedness, and so forth. 
Attention is key in learning, cognition, and instruction; attention can be personally, 
environmentally, socially, and culturally motivated. How do explicit and implicit learning 
together support language acquisition, what is the nature of their interface? 
Understanding how usage affects languages calls for ‘big-data’ corpus investigations of 
representative language usage in different sociocultural institutions and communities of 
practices and how these change over time. The analysis of the distributional characteristics of 
linguistic constructions and their meanings as representative of the language that learners 
experience requires considerable computational corpus analysis and Natural Language 
Processing; then these findings need to inform experimental studies of processing (Gries & 
Divjak, 2012; Gries & Wulff, 2009; McEnery & Hardie, 2012; Rebuschat, Meurers, & McEnery, 
2017). How the participant agents and processes interact dynamically while maintaining robust 
latent structures demands collaborations with Complex Adaptive Systems, Dynamic Systems 
Theory, and Networks Science.  
There is much else still to research. There is considerable research in first language 
acquisition; second language acquisition has had less attention; the multilingual focus of the 
present volume prioritizes expanding these inquiries to “all types, all shades and grades, of 
multilingualism” (Ortega, 2019, this issue, p. xxx). Ortega explains these research priorities very 
clearly in her contribution to this special volume. 
Christiansen and Chater (2017) conclude their article “Towards an integrated science of 
language” like this: 
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Reintegrating the language sciences also presents huge opportunities for linking 
together different aspects of the study of language: viewing language acquisition as 
the process of acquiring the ability to process specific constructions; seeing language 
evolution as shaped by the processing and learning biases of the brain; providing a 
historical explanation for language change and variation based on the diffusion and 
modification of constructions; and reconnecting linguistics with the construction of 
workable computer language processing systems. Although such reintegration has 
been hampered in the past by the fragmentation of the study of language across 
university departments, conferences and funding bodies, the tide is now shifting and 
an integrated science of language is gradually emerging. We envisage a future where 
broad, interdisciplinary departments of language science will become increasingly 
common.” (p. 3). 
 
<A>IMPLICATIONS FOR TEACHING 
A longstanding concern of applied linguistics is the investigation of the different 
patterns of language competence that result from different patterns of language experience 
(classroom instruction vs. naturalistic exposure; foreign/second/heritage/first language 
acquisition; early vs. late exposure; simultaneous vs. successive bilingualism; implicit vs. explicit 
language learning; spoken vs. written exposure; implicit and explicit language learning; focus on 
meaning/focus on formS/focus on form; types of correction; etc. (N. Ellis, 1994; R. Ellis, 2010; 
Kelly, 1969; Long & Robinson, 1998; Long & Doughty, 2009; Spada, 2011). The interest is both 
theoretical and applied in that answers to these questions allow the catering of language experience to 
different language learner needs. The relevant enquiries are ongoing. However, we know broadly 
that a focus on grammar results in grammatical competence, sometimes accompanied by low 
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fluency, whereas a focus on meaning can results in communicative competence and fluency, 
sometimes accompanied by low accuracy. 
Forty years ago, Krashen (1982) described students of grammar-instruction who had 
“learned” and could explain rules like the third person singular “-s”, but who were not able to 
use them in casual conversations because they had not yet ‘acquired’ them. Krashen’s response 
was to advocate a Natural Approach, which held that (a) language acquisition does not require 
extensive use of conscious grammatical rules, and does not require tedious drill; (b) acquisition 
requires meaningful interaction in the target language—natural communication—in which 
speakers are concerned not with the form of their utterances but with the messages they are 
conveying and understanding; (c) comprehensible input is the crucial and necessary ingredient 
for the acquisition of language; and (d) that real world conversations with sympathetic native 
speakers who are willing to help the acquirer understand are very helpful. 
Lightbown (2008, pp. 28–29) summarized the subsequent 30 years as follows: 
For more than thirty years, pedagogical practice and second language research 
have emphasized the value of language learning that takes place in situations 
where learners are actually engaged in using language rather than in learning 
word lists and grammar rules in anticipation of using the language at some 
future time. This includes instructional models such as content-based instruction 
or a version of communicative language teaching in which there is essentially no 
form-focused language teaching and students are expected to learn language 
“incidentally”, while their attention is focused on meaning (Howatt, 1984; Snow, 
Met, & Genesee, 1992). Form-focused instruction that is isolated from 
communicative language use has become rare in many classrooms (Lightbown & 
Spada, 2006). The preference is to integrate form focus into a rich 
communicative context (Long & Robinson, 1998). One approach to language 
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teaching that has been strongly criticized is the kind of mechanical drill in which 
students repeat sentences that are related only by the fact that they share some 
grammatical pattern (Lightbown, 1983; Long, 1991; Wong & VanPatten, 2003). 
DeKeyser (1998) makes this point particularly well when he says, ‘Drills make 
sense only if they are defined in terms of behaviors to be drilled (. . .) but 
[audiolingual methodologists] forgot to define the behaviors they wanted to 
establish (. . .) conveying personal meanings’ (pp. 53–54).  
These emphases are sustained now in socially and culturally motivated approaches to 
language exposure, as already quoted from Wagner (2015, p. 75): “The target for many second 
language learners is not just ‘to speak another language,’ but to become part of the social and 
cultural environment in which the language is used. This entails frequent and rich participation 
in the second-language life worlds into which the learner ‘bricolages’ his or her way.” Digital 
technologies give increasing opportunities for rich ‘rewilding’ of education (Dubreil & Thorne, 
2017; Thorne, 2018) and we should be optimistic that such embodied, environmentally 
embedded, enacted, socially encultured, and situated environments (Eskildsen & Wagner, 2015) 
can provide flow and concomitantly rich language learning. 
Nevertheless, there are certain aspects of language to which uninstructed second 
language learners operating in the real-world wilds commonly prove impervious, where input 
fails to become intake (Corder,1967). Schmidt’s paradigm case of a naturalistic learner, Wes, 
was very fluent, with high levels of strategic competence, but low levels of grammatical 
accuracy. He was described as being interested in the message, not the form, and as being 
impatient with correction. In discussing Wes’s unconscious naturalistic acquisition of English as 
a second language (ESL) in the 5 years since coming to America, Schmidt (1984) reported:  
If language is seen as a medium of communication, as a tool for initiating, 
maintaining and regulating relationships and carrying on the business of life, then W 
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has been a successful language learner (. . .). If language acquisition is taken to mean 
(as it usually is) the acquisition of grammatical structures, then the acquisition 
approach may be working, but very slowly (. . .). Using 90% correct in obligatory 
contexts as the criterion for acquisition, none of the grammatical morphemes 
counted has changed from unacquired to acquired status over a five year period. (p. 
5) 
Likewise, in the large European Science Foundation (ESF) crosslinguistic and 
longitudinal research project, Klein and Perdue (1992) examined how 40 adult learners picked 
up the language of their social environment by everyday communication. They described the 
interlanguage of these learners as the ‘Basic Variety.’ All learners, independent of source 
language and target language, developed and used it, with about one-third of them fossilizing at 
this level in that although they learned more words, they did not further complexify their 
utterances in respects of morphology or syntax. In this Basic Variety, most lexical items stem 
from the target language, but they are uninflected. “ 
There is no functional morphology. By far most lexical items correspond to 
nouns, verbs and adverbs; closed-class items, in particular determiners, 
subordinating elements, and prepositions, are rare, if present at all (. . .). Note 
that there is no functional inflection whatsoever: no tense, no aspect, no mood, 
no agreement, no casemarking, no gender assignment; nor are there, for 
example, any expletive elements” (Klein, 1998, pp. 554–555).  
At the population level too, the proportion of second language speakers affects the 
morphological complexity of the language (N. Ellis, 2008a; McWhorter, 2002, 2004; Mufwene, 
2001, 2008; Trudgill, 2002a, 2002b). 
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There are good cognitive psychological reasons why functional morphology is less 
learnable than lexis in SLA because of factors including low salience, low contingency, blocking, 
and learned attention (N. Ellis, 2006c, 2008c, 2017) and thus why form-focussed instruction 
might be relevant if that is what particular language learners want to be able to do in their 
language (Doughty & Williams, 1998; N. Ellis, 2005). The problem then is how best to integrate 
focus on meaning and form-focused instruction, and a lot of careful thought and educational 
research has been dedicated to this problem (Doughty & Long, 2003; R. Ellis, 2005, 2012; Long 
& Doughty, 2009; Ortega, 2013). Task-based language teaching (TBLT; R. Ellis, 2003; Long, 
2014) tries to encourage interaction and engagement in meaningful authentic language while 
focussing students to do meaningful tasks using the target language. Robinson and Ellis (2008), 
Littlemore (2009), Tyler (2012), and Ortega et al. (2016) describe usage-inspired L2 teaching 
and other applications of cognitive-linguistics. However, the full implications of this theory of 
language cognition for teacher training, teaching methods, and educational policy require 
extensive further consideration. 
The various learner competences outlined in this section are different. They are simply 
different, not objectively worse or better than one another. Semantics and syntax play their 
different roles in our essential communications. It is a worthy linguistic exercise to describe 
different profiles of complexity, accuracy, and fluency, and a worthy goal of cognitive 
psychology and usage-based linguistics to understand their origins. Different language 
experiences result in different types of language knowledge. If the goal is sharing 
communication in the here-and-now, that is quite a different goal from writing an essay for 
academic purposes. Some learners strive for fluency, some for grammatical correctness, some 
for sharing meanings, some for cultural integration. We should acknowledge and support 
learners’ linguistic goals toward self-determination (Norton, 2000) and agency (Larsen–
Freeman, 2019, this issue).  
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Linguistic prescriptivism is a different matter entirely (Curzan, 2014; Joseph, 1987). As 
Ortega (2019, this issue) cautions, the field of SLA should ever strive to avoid unconscious 
prescriptivism through judgmental comparisons against native speaker norms. We are all 
subject to implicit bias relating to self-justification, ethnocentrism, homophily, ingroup bias, and 
outgroup antipathy (Nosek, Hawkins, & Frazier, 2011; Staats et al., 2015), and there is arguably 
no greater source of self and identity than language. Heeding Ortega’s call for a broadening of 
our focus toward the wider world of multilingualism will not only act against this trend, but will 
also increase the validity, relevance, and interest of our research base.  
 
<A>INDIVIDUALS AND THEIR ECOLOGY 
 
Languages, usage, culture, social experience, are all ecological phenomena. They are 
emergent from complex adaptive systems. So much so, that one can imagine that they are 
basically indivisible from their environments. Yeats’s poem “Among school children” (1989, 
originally published 1928) questions both his own lifelong search for a unity of being and 
modern regimented curricula that deny creative individuality. He later revised this work, 
lightening the pessimism by means of the addition of a final stanza that sees a possibility of 
understanding the whole in terms of the unity of dynamics and complexity: He asks “How can 
we know the dancer from the dance?” and “O chestnut tree, great rooted blossomer, Are you the 
leaf, the blossom, or the bole?” In recognizing variation, individuality, and contextualization in 
time and space, we must not lose sight of the wood for the trees. 
As researchers, we might identify one individual in the community, focus in on them, 
and identify their idiosyncratic characteristics. They carry their language with them to tell their 
life stories in their characteristic ways. Individuals have constancies – individual differences are 
reliable. As linguists we might stop the speech stream and identify individual unit patterns, 
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which we might label as a phoneme, lexeme, morpheme, or other construction. We can identify 
and label these and other speech acts in their registers and genres as they strike us as being 
interesting categories in the ecology. And often, when we look for others of the same type, we 
find they share reliable associations and interpretations. Any of these types also have 
characteristic patterns of interaction in collocation, or lexicosyntax, or sociolinguistic choice. 
Usage is patterned both syntagmatically and paradigmatically. Ecologies are patterned both 
synchronically and diachronically. Theories are likewise situated in their time, their place, and 
their thinkers. Patterns are emergent. 
The Three Goals 
The first goal is to see the thing clearly itself 
in and for itself, to see it simply and clearly 
for what it is. 
No symbolism, please. 
 
The second goal is to see each individual thing 
as unified, as one, with all the other 
ten thousand things. 
In this regard, a little wine helps a lot. 
 
The third goal is to grasp the first and second goals, 
to see the universal and the particular, 
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simultaneously. 
Regarding this one, call me when you get it. 
       (Budbill, 1999) 
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